Prolonged wars, although often criticised, can act as the origin of a nation's empire.
As a result of failed Western intervention operations in Asia and the Middle East, the idea of long wars has become even more unpopular. Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese military general, made the claim, in his renowned The Art of War, that there "is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare." While it is true that long wars often hurt countries, I disagree with Sun Tzu’s summary. His assertion was the culmination of a long description of the various costs associated with war. Among other things, Sun Tzu cites the cost of weaponry, the strength expended while laying siege to a town and the cost of providing for soldiers; “if the campaign is protracted [prolonged], the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.”
While I accept that prolonged warfare discourage political stability in a nation, typically dampens national morale and has long-reaching human costs, Sun Tzu’s analysis fails to account for the potential benefits of warfare. This is the first problem with his analysis. A prolonged state of warfare can often be the genesis of a nation’s status as a superpower. I believe that the two most pertinent examples of this are Rome’s dominance over Europe in the centuries after the Punic Wars, Pax Romana, and Britain’s global hegemony, or Pax Britannica. Rome’s victory over Carthage would set it on the path to becoming the superpower of the known world. It changed the course of the Western world: impacting European languages, legal practices and systems of government. The legacy of the British Empire was similar, as a result of its dominance, many nations would adopt aspects of British life, whether it be the language, the sports played, the system of government or even the legal code.
The second problem with Sun Tzu’s conclusion is that he excludes the possibility that a nation might wage war for pre-emptive purposes. “If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.” Sun Tzu formulates a strong argument as to why attacking wars might not be a good idea; however, he completely neglects to assess the benefits and drawbacks of pre-emptive wars. This is a major shortfall of his evaluation; therefore, his words should, at the very most, only be applied to offensive warfare.
It is difficult to determine whether the Punic Wars were ultimately inevitable, and could thus be considered pre-emptive. At the beginning of the Wars, Rome had conquered the Italian Peninsula, which the exception of the north, then under the control of the Gauls. Carthage was the foremost economic and political power in the Mediterranean region, renown for its mercantile economic system. The Third Punic War occurred between the years 149 BC and 146 BC, completing the nearly twelve decades of conflict between Rome and Carthage. It involved a siege of the city of Carthage and resulted in the destruction of much of Carthage’s own written history and culture. Carthage’s time as the dominant force in the Mediterranean was over. Rome gained control of the islands of Corsica, Sicily and Sardinia, its first overseas possessions, and acquired the Iberian Peninsula. In the century after, Rome would go on to conquer nearby Greece and Asia Minor, later the rest of Western Europe. The siege of Carthage ended more than one hundred and twenty years of conflict between Rome and Carthage, a period which included three wars and millions of lives. There likely would have been much debate amongst Roman Senators: would the complete destruction of Rome’s first major rival, Carthage, justify the fiscal and human costs associated? To fight against Carthage a third time would be to protract the campaign, an action Sun Tzu said would indebt the State.
Given that Sun Tzu was referring to the immediate costs of war (human losses and budget expenditure), I believe that he was accurate in saying “there is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare.” There were 770, 000 casualties in the Second Punic War alone, with five hundred thousand of those deaths being Romans. This was a significant portion of the Roman population, and, had Sun Tzu seen statistics for military expenditure and human life lost at the end of the siege of Carthage in 146 BC, he would have likely categorised the Punic Wars as another example of nations failing to benefit from prolonged warfare. From the Carthaginian perspective, Sun Tzu’s words would have resonated ever true. In addition to losing Carthaginian Iberia, Carthage also lost two hundred and seventy thousand men. In stark contrast, as we know that the Romans would go on to have an empire of 5 million square kilometres, ruling much of Europe for many centuries; influencing the vocabulary of multiple modern languages, such as English and Spanish, inspiring modern republics, such as France and the United States of America; establishing the basis of many civil legal codes, we know that the Punic Wars were ultimately a success for Rome. Via the lens of history, we can say with certainty that Rome benefited from its decision to fight Carthage in the Third Punic Wars.
Another example in which prolonged warfare served as an origin for a nation’s empire is the impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Britain’s global status. After the defeat of France in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), Britain emerged as the foremost imperial power of the 19th century, largely due to its naval strength. The United Kingdom, formerly Great Britain, had been France’s most consistent enemy in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. After Napoleon’s ascent to power in France, Britain began to fear that he would invade the island, given that he had gathered an army of two hundred thousand men, and was training and preparing them for war with the United Kingdom. Napoleon, in 1804, explicitly declared desires to invade England, writing in a letter to the French ambassador at Constantinople, “In the present position of Europe all my thoughts are directed towards England".
The United Kingdom was just one of Napoleonic France’s many opponents in its quest for European domination. Other states that fought against the French in the early 19th century include Austria, Russia, Prussia and Spain. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had long been an antagonist of France, the two countries had almost constantly been at war for the seven and a half centuries prior. The United Kingdom invested greatly into the war effort against France. In addition to building its own military, the British budget also spent significant resources subsidising its allies, funding about four hundred and fifty thousand Russian and Austrian men in 1813. At home, in the same calendar year, the Royal Navy spent £23,716,390, more than 11 times the expenditure figure for 1790. Borrowing during the war raised the total of the national debt to £900 million. This demonstrates Sun Tzu’s statement that “the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain”.
However, where Sun Tzu failed was in the future gains in resources that might be acquired. The Napoleonic wars resulted in the exile of Napoleon to Elba and the fall of the French Empire. This created a vacuum in world politics, which Britain was primed to fill. The political power acquired on account of the Napoleonic Wars eventually resulted in an improving British economy, and the beginning of what some historians refer to as Britain’s “imperial century”.
The Spanish Empire had similar origins too. Christopher Columbus' fabled voyage to the New World was only possible after the eight-century-long Reconquista, which pushed the Islamic caliphates out of Iberia. There is no doubt that the Reconquista had a great human cost. It is estimated that more than seven million people died in the Christian endeavour to dominate the Iberian Peninsula. But for the Spanish, the effects were obvious within a few generations of victory over the Muslims. In the same year that the Emirate of Granada surrendered to the Spaniards (1492), Columbus sailed across the Atlantic for the Americas, setting the Spanish Empire into motion. And, just like the Romans had done, and just as the British would later do, the Spaniards would go onto leave a lasting legacy on the world. As a result of Spanish imperialism, Roman Catholicism went global, Spanish became the world's second-most spoken first language and numerous towns and cities were named for Spanish heroes.
But why? What about a long war with an old rival predisposes a nation for greatness? I believe the answer is this: long wars are only undertaken by nations on the verge of greatness. When two nations that are close in power fight, the war is inevitably prolonged. The lack of a clearly dominant party, results in stalemates and slow advances. The Reconquista, the Napoleonic Wars and the Punic Wars all suffice as examples. However, nations are rarely willing to fight that long, unless the prize is great. Historically, the only prize has been global domination. Therefore, the only nations that are willing to fight that long are nations on the brink of success, nations with a hope of stardom.
As smaller, less significant nations surrender in desperation, greater nations hang on in hope of glory. The smaller the nation, the more likely they are to think of wars in the same way Sun Tzu thought of them. The less significant a nation, the more it is concerned with survival, as opposed to dominance. Because it is concerned foremost with survival, the small nation views looks at war through the lens of Sun Tzu: how much will the campaign cost; how long will it take; what are the risks; how many men might die? The animal at the bottom of the food chain is concerned with survival; the species at the top of the food chain are concerned with conquest.
Great nations fight amongst each other for a while, eventually, of those great nations, an empire is born.
As a result of failed Western intervention operations in Asia and the Middle East, the idea of long wars has become even more unpopular. Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese military general, made the claim, in his renowned The Art of War, that there "is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare." While it is true that long wars often hurt countries, I disagree with Sun Tzu’s summary. His assertion was the culmination of a long description of the various costs associated with war. Among other things, Sun Tzu cites the cost of weaponry, the strength expended while laying siege to a town and the cost of providing for soldiers; “if the campaign is protracted [prolonged], the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.”
While I accept that prolonged warfare discourage political stability in a nation, typically dampens national morale and has long-reaching human costs, Sun Tzu’s analysis fails to account for the potential benefits of warfare. This is the first problem with his analysis. A prolonged state of warfare can often be the genesis of a nation’s status as a superpower. I believe that the two most pertinent examples of this are Rome’s dominance over Europe in the centuries after the Punic Wars, Pax Romana, and Britain’s global hegemony, or Pax Britannica. Rome’s victory over Carthage would set it on the path to becoming the superpower of the known world. It changed the course of the Western world: impacting European languages, legal practices and systems of government. The legacy of the British Empire was similar, as a result of its dominance, many nations would adopt aspects of British life, whether it be the language, the sports played, the system of government or even the legal code.
The second problem with Sun Tzu’s conclusion is that he excludes the possibility that a nation might wage war for pre-emptive purposes. “If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.” Sun Tzu formulates a strong argument as to why attacking wars might not be a good idea; however, he completely neglects to assess the benefits and drawbacks of pre-emptive wars. This is a major shortfall of his evaluation; therefore, his words should, at the very most, only be applied to offensive warfare.
It is difficult to determine whether the Punic Wars were ultimately inevitable, and could thus be considered pre-emptive. At the beginning of the Wars, Rome had conquered the Italian Peninsula, which the exception of the north, then under the control of the Gauls. Carthage was the foremost economic and political power in the Mediterranean region, renown for its mercantile economic system. The Third Punic War occurred between the years 149 BC and 146 BC, completing the nearly twelve decades of conflict between Rome and Carthage. It involved a siege of the city of Carthage and resulted in the destruction of much of Carthage’s own written history and culture. Carthage’s time as the dominant force in the Mediterranean was over. Rome gained control of the islands of Corsica, Sicily and Sardinia, its first overseas possessions, and acquired the Iberian Peninsula. In the century after, Rome would go on to conquer nearby Greece and Asia Minor, later the rest of Western Europe. The siege of Carthage ended more than one hundred and twenty years of conflict between Rome and Carthage, a period which included three wars and millions of lives. There likely would have been much debate amongst Roman Senators: would the complete destruction of Rome’s first major rival, Carthage, justify the fiscal and human costs associated? To fight against Carthage a third time would be to protract the campaign, an action Sun Tzu said would indebt the State.
Given that Sun Tzu was referring to the immediate costs of war (human losses and budget expenditure), I believe that he was accurate in saying “there is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare.” There were 770, 000 casualties in the Second Punic War alone, with five hundred thousand of those deaths being Romans. This was a significant portion of the Roman population, and, had Sun Tzu seen statistics for military expenditure and human life lost at the end of the siege of Carthage in 146 BC, he would have likely categorised the Punic Wars as another example of nations failing to benefit from prolonged warfare. From the Carthaginian perspective, Sun Tzu’s words would have resonated ever true. In addition to losing Carthaginian Iberia, Carthage also lost two hundred and seventy thousand men. In stark contrast, as we know that the Romans would go on to have an empire of 5 million square kilometres, ruling much of Europe for many centuries; influencing the vocabulary of multiple modern languages, such as English and Spanish, inspiring modern republics, such as France and the United States of America; establishing the basis of many civil legal codes, we know that the Punic Wars were ultimately a success for Rome. Via the lens of history, we can say with certainty that Rome benefited from its decision to fight Carthage in the Third Punic Wars.
Another example in which prolonged warfare served as an origin for a nation’s empire is the impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Britain’s global status. After the defeat of France in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), Britain emerged as the foremost imperial power of the 19th century, largely due to its naval strength. The United Kingdom, formerly Great Britain, had been France’s most consistent enemy in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. After Napoleon’s ascent to power in France, Britain began to fear that he would invade the island, given that he had gathered an army of two hundred thousand men, and was training and preparing them for war with the United Kingdom. Napoleon, in 1804, explicitly declared desires to invade England, writing in a letter to the French ambassador at Constantinople, “In the present position of Europe all my thoughts are directed towards England".
The United Kingdom was just one of Napoleonic France’s many opponents in its quest for European domination. Other states that fought against the French in the early 19th century include Austria, Russia, Prussia and Spain. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had long been an antagonist of France, the two countries had almost constantly been at war for the seven and a half centuries prior. The United Kingdom invested greatly into the war effort against France. In addition to building its own military, the British budget also spent significant resources subsidising its allies, funding about four hundred and fifty thousand Russian and Austrian men in 1813. At home, in the same calendar year, the Royal Navy spent £23,716,390, more than 11 times the expenditure figure for 1790. Borrowing during the war raised the total of the national debt to £900 million. This demonstrates Sun Tzu’s statement that “the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain”.
However, where Sun Tzu failed was in the future gains in resources that might be acquired. The Napoleonic wars resulted in the exile of Napoleon to Elba and the fall of the French Empire. This created a vacuum in world politics, which Britain was primed to fill. The political power acquired on account of the Napoleonic Wars eventually resulted in an improving British economy, and the beginning of what some historians refer to as Britain’s “imperial century”.
The Spanish Empire had similar origins too. Christopher Columbus' fabled voyage to the New World was only possible after the eight-century-long Reconquista, which pushed the Islamic caliphates out of Iberia. There is no doubt that the Reconquista had a great human cost. It is estimated that more than seven million people died in the Christian endeavour to dominate the Iberian Peninsula. But for the Spanish, the effects were obvious within a few generations of victory over the Muslims. In the same year that the Emirate of Granada surrendered to the Spaniards (1492), Columbus sailed across the Atlantic for the Americas, setting the Spanish Empire into motion. And, just like the Romans had done, and just as the British would later do, the Spaniards would go onto leave a lasting legacy on the world. As a result of Spanish imperialism, Roman Catholicism went global, Spanish became the world's second-most spoken first language and numerous towns and cities were named for Spanish heroes.
But why? What about a long war with an old rival predisposes a nation for greatness? I believe the answer is this: long wars are only undertaken by nations on the verge of greatness. When two nations that are close in power fight, the war is inevitably prolonged. The lack of a clearly dominant party, results in stalemates and slow advances. The Reconquista, the Napoleonic Wars and the Punic Wars all suffice as examples. However, nations are rarely willing to fight that long, unless the prize is great. Historically, the only prize has been global domination. Therefore, the only nations that are willing to fight that long are nations on the brink of success, nations with a hope of stardom.
As smaller, less significant nations surrender in desperation, greater nations hang on in hope of glory. The smaller the nation, the more likely they are to think of wars in the same way Sun Tzu thought of them. The less significant a nation, the more it is concerned with survival, as opposed to dominance. Because it is concerned foremost with survival, the small nation views looks at war through the lens of Sun Tzu: how much will the campaign cost; how long will it take; what are the risks; how many men might die? The animal at the bottom of the food chain is concerned with survival; the species at the top of the food chain are concerned with conquest.
Great nations fight amongst each other for a while, eventually, of those great nations, an empire is born.
[1] Sun
Tzu begins Book II of The Art of War warning advising his reader as to why
offensive warfare usually fails. https://suntzusaid.com/book/2
[2] “There
was one stereotype to which Carthage did conform: as the greatest mercantile
power that ever existed in the ancient Mediterranean” - Miles, Richard.
"Carthage: A Mediterranean Superpower." Historically
Speaking 12, no. 4 (2011): 35-37. doi:10.1353/hsp.2011.0059.
[3] “When
they destroyed Carthage in 146 B.C. the Romans did an extraordinarily thorough
job with regard to Carthaginian learning.” - Miles, Richard. "Carthage: A
Mediterranean Superpower." Historically Speaking 12, no. 4
(2011): 35-37. doi:10.1353/hsp.2011.0059.
[4] White, Matthew. “The Great Big
Book of Horrible Things: The Definitive Chronicle of History’s 100 Worst
Atrocities”
[5] White, Matthew. “The Great Big
Book of Horrible Things: The Definitive Chronicle of History’s 100 Worst
Atrocities”
[6] Taagepera, Rein. "Size
and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 B.C. to 600
A.D." Social Science History 3, no. 3/4 (1979): 115-38. Accessed
June 14, 2020. doi:10.2307/1170959
[7] Tellier, L.-N. Urban World History:
An Economic and Geographical Perspective. Quebec: PUQ. p. 463. (2009).
[8]“He was appointed commander of
the Army of England encamped outside the French”-Lipscombe, Nick. “Napoleon’s
Obsession – The Invasion of England” British Journal for Military History,
Volume 1, Issue 3, June 2015
[9] Longmate, Norman. “Island
Fortress: The Defence of Great Britain 1606 to 1945” (2011)
[10] Kennedy, Paul, The Rise
and Fall of the Great Powers – economic change and military conflict from 1500
to 2000 (1989), pp. 128–9
[11] Flinn, Michael W. “An
Economic and Social History of Britain Since 1700” (1963), p.61
[12] “The answer is that trade and
empire went hand in hand, with a symbiotic relationship to each other.”-Morgan,
Kenneth. “Symbiosis: Trade and the British Empire” (2007)
[13] Hyam, Ronald (2002). “Britain's Imperial Century, 1815–1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion”, p.1
[16] Latin phrase from Cato the
Censor, a politician of the Roman Republic. It translates into English as,
"Furthermore, I consider that Carthage must be destroyed". It is said
that Cato concluded all his speeches with this phrase, to make a case for the
Third Punic War.
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